On March 18, 2007, at a little after 4:00 a.m., an Escambia County Sheriff's Deputy was dispatched to investigate a report of suspicious activity called in by a hotel clerk identified in the record only as “Glenda.” En route to the hotel, the deputy saw a car matching the description in the CAD report. The deputy turned behind it and stopped the car. Appellant was driving and there was one other person in the car.

The deputy told the Mr. Cooks and the passenger, Jerry Gillard, that there was “suspicious activity at a hotel close by” and “they stated that they had been coming from that hotel.” The deputy asked Mr. Cooks to come to the back of the car, which he did. While Mr. Cooks remained behind, the deputy went to speak with Gillard. The deputy then noticed “a small baggie of green leafy substance pushed down next to [Gillard's] leg.” The deputy asked Gillard to get out of the car and arrested him. The deputy then searched Appellant and found crack cocaine in his jacket, at which point he was arrested.

The Court held: the instant case involves a citizen's claim of suspicious activity that has a minimal objective basis and, except for innocent details of identification, is uncorroborated by law enforcement's subsequent observations. Corroboration of nothing more than innocent details of identification (e.g., a license plate number) assists the state in making the required showing that the information was sufficiently detailed to single out the suspect. It does not, however, create or support a suspicion that crime is afoot, which is essential if a report of generalized, allegedly suspicious activity is to justify a stop. The absence of this suspicion is fatal to the state's position.

The Court suppressed the evidence and the case was thrown out.

A deputy initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle whose tag did not match the vehicle.  The Defendant was a passenger in that vehicle. After stopping the vehicle, the Deputy learned that the driver did not have a valid driver's license. When the driver admitted that he was aware his driver's license was suspended, the driver was arrested.

Officer did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify detention of defendant, and thus defendant's arrest was unlawful and he could not be convicted of giving false name during arrest or lawful detention, where officer candidly acknowledged that he had only hunch that defendant and his companion were involved in drug transaction, that he was uncertain whether anything was actually exchanged between the men, he did not say that he had any extensive or specialized narcotics training, and he did not identify defendant or his companion as known drug dealers.

The Court held that an officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigatory detention of a front seat passenger where the officer testified that he did not know whether the passenger had been wearing a seat belt while the car was moving. In this case similarly when the Officer approached the vehicle, he noticed that Cooks was not wearing a seat belt. The officer testified that he did not see Cooks with the seat belt off while the car was moving. Therefore, because the officer did not have the reasonable suspicion needed to conduct an investigatory detention for the seat belt violation, the contact between Cooks and the officers was necessarily a consensual encounter. As a result, the subsequent arrest that occurred for giving a false name was illegal.

This Court specifically rejected a Fourth District Court of Appeals descision in Ferrer v. State.  The Fourth District covers Palm Beach County and Broward so this new case is very important. 

The issue involved a motion to suppress evidence that was filed by the defense challenging the legality of the stop in a DUI (driving under the influence) case.  That driver was pulled over by one officer.  That officer then summoned a fellow officer who specialized in DUI enforcement.  The second officer determined that the driver was impaired and arrested him. 

At the motion hearing to challenge the legality of the stop the first officer failed to show up.  The second officer was the only one to testify.  The issue in these cases was the application of the "Fellow Officer rule" to this scenario.  The law is this:

The fellow officer rule provides a mechanism by which officers can rely on their collective knowledge to act in the field. Under this rule, the collective knowledge of officers investigating a crime is imputed to each officer and one officer may rely on the knowledge and information possessed by another officer to establish probable cause

However, The fellow officer rule is not a rule of evidence. It does not change the rules of evidence. And, it is not one of the enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule.  The Court said that the lower court , as did the Ferrer court, misapplied the rule. The issue raised in the Bowers' motion to suppress was not whether there was probable cause for the second Officerto conduct a DUI investigation and make an arrest but rather whether there was probable cause for the first Officer to stop Bowers. At that point of the traffic stop, there was no investigative chain during which collective knowledge was imputed to the second officer to provide probable cause for the traffic stop. The first Officer was the sole person with any knowledge leading up to and culminating in the traffic stop. The second Officer did not rely on any knowledge or information possessed by the Officer who stopped the driver or any other officer to establish probable cause to stop Bowers. The fact that second Officer was called to the scene after the stopwas completed for the purpose of performing a separate DUI investigation does not make him a fellow officer for purposes of determining whether there was probable cause to support the traffic stop.

It is yet to be scene how our Circuit Court, and the Fourth District will apply this new case.  The Law Office of Robert Norvell will certainly keep you posted.

The Defendant was a passenger in a pickup truck that was being driven in Plant City after midnight on June 13, 2008. A Plant City police officer noticed a pickup truck drive by and saw that its tag light was not working. This officer then decided to stop the pickup truck for this traffic infraction.

The officer pulled directly behind the pickup truck and activated his lights and siren. As the truck pulled into a gas station and started to slow down, the officer saw the Defendant throw an item out of the passenger window. After the truck stopped, Officer Ward located the item that had been thrown because it was clearly visible on the hard surface of the gas station parking lot. The recovered item was a package containing three small baggies that each contained a substance that field-tested positive as methamphetamine.

The State Attorney charged the Defendant attempted tampering with physical evidence.  The Court dismissed the charge and held the following: "the Defendant's act of tossing the driver's package of methamphetamine out the window-as if engaged in an illicit game of “hot potato”-in the clear sight of Officer Ward would not constitute attempted tampering. While E.I. was clearly trying to disassociate himself from the package, there is nothing about this act under the circumstances presented here that shows that E.I. was trying to alter, destroy, or conceal the package. Further, while E.I. did remove the package from his hand, he did not remove it from the scene of the traffic stop. Thus, this act was factually and legally nothing more than abandonment, and the trial court should have granted E.I.'s motion for judgment of dismissal."

The defendant was stopped by an officer for a traffic offense.  Another officer then arrived and this second officer began an investigation which led to the arrest of the defendant for DUI.  At the Motion to Suppress hearing the first officer failed to appear and the trial court granted the Motion and dismissed the case.  The State appealed and the first appellate court determined that the trial court was wrong and applied the "the fellow officer rule."  Under this rule, the collective knowledge of officers investigating a crime is imputed to each officer and one officer may rely on the knowledge and information possessed by another officer to establish probable cause.  Under the rule, one officer may rely on the knowledge and information possessed by another officer to establish probable cause for an arrest for a felony or misdemeanor offense, Boatman, 901 So.2d at 224, or to establish probable cause for a search.

The Defense appealed this decision and the 2nd District agreed with the Trial Court and said the circuit court, misapplied the "fellow officer rule." The issue raised in Bowers' motion to suppress was not whether there was probable cause for Officer Tracy to conduct a DUIinvestigation and make an arrest but rather whether there was probable cause for Officer Suskovich to stop Bowers. At that point of the traffic stop, there was no “investigative chain” during which collective knowledge was imputed to Officer Suskovich to provide probable cause for the traffic stop. Officer Suskovich was the sole officer with any knowledge leading up to and culminating in the traffic stop. Officer Suskovich did not rely on any knowledge or information possessed by Officer Tracy or any other officer to establish probable cause to stop Bowers. The fact that Officer Tracy was called to the scene after the stop was completed for the purpose of performing a separate DUI investigation does not make him a fellow officer for purposes of determining whether there was probable cause to support the traffic stop.

Therefore, the case was sent back to the lower court and the case was dismissed.

Raed Aldin appeals his convictions for burglary and theft. He argues that evidence was seized from his car in violation of the Fourth Amendment and should not have been introduced at his trial. We conclude that this argument is well taken.  The encounter with the defendant in this case began at 1:00 a.m., followed by arrest and transportation to the police station. The defendant denied consent to search the van at 6:00 a.m. The van was later towed away and searched. The search of the van cannot be considered a search incident to a recent occupant's arrest. Under Gant, the search was unreasonable.

Drivers, who had been convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) prior to enactment of statute authorizing Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to require installation of ignition interlock devices in their vehicles, brought action against Department and its executive director, seeking to recover for Department's issuance of letters requiring installation of the device by all DUI offenders, even in cases where Department lacked authority to order the device. 

Prior to July 1, 2005, the Department was not authorized to require any DUI offender to install the ignition interlock device unless the installation had been ordered by the trial court. Nevertheless, the Department issued letters to all DUI offenders, including those convicted before July 1, 2005, requiring the device, even in cases where it lacked the authority to do so.

The decision of the Court on this matter is rather convoluted as it addresses in complex minutia application of Federal Constitutional Claims and State Consitutional Claims regarding the difference between a right and a privilege regarding a citizen's license. 

The applicable holding is that "under some circumstances, a driver's license may implicate a protectable property interest for purposes of § 1983."  Thus, a license cannot be taken or restrictions placed on it as a penalty without due process.  The Court then remanded to lower court to figure out if the Department was wrong.   

Police officer detained the driver of a vehicle who was asleep in his car while in a restaurant drive-though lane when he opened the vehicle's door and placed it in park. The officer did not have a founded suspicion that the driver had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime or traffic infraction. Moreover, there was insufficient evidence to show that this detention was necessary to preventthe driver from waking, driving forward, and placing others in danger. The Court then threw out the DUI.

Second Judicial Circuit (Leon County).

Police stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction and the driver was handcuffed immediately.  According to the police, this was "done as a matter of routine."  The Court held that this was an unreasonable response to the situation in light of the evidence presented.  Thus, the court threw out the drugs that were found after the police later searched the driver's vehicle.

Second Judicial Circuit (Leon County).

This decision is a huge blow to the police's use of "search incident to arrest" which, previous to this decision, allowed an officer to tear apart a vehicle after the driver was arrested for anything.  Specifically that case said the following: The limitation to a search incident to arrest, that it may only include the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control, that is the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence, defines the boundaries of this exception to the warrant requirement and ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.

An officer with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, was on patrol in a Wildlife Management area. He was a vehicle near a river, backing away. The officer initiated his blue lights to stop the truck to conduct "a resource inspection." As the officer approached he smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle. The driver and a passenger were then taken out of the vehicle, handcuffed, and searched. They admitted to having smoked "a joint" about an hour before. The officer searched the vehicle and located a bag of marijuana in the toolbox in the bed of the truck.

The Court found that plain language of Florida statutes limits the power of a wildlife officer to make arrests and board vehicles when the officer has probable cause to believe that laws or regulations are being violated. They found no statutory authority for a wildlife officer to stop a citizen for a regulatory inspection without any reasonable suspicion that the person is violating any law or wildlife regulation. Nor did they find any cases that would suggest a different approach. Warrantless stops and arrests by wildlife officers use the same laws generally applicable to law enforcement officers.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the officer needed reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Thus the lower court was reversed and the case was went back to the trial court to grant the motion, which will entitle the Defendant to discharge from the charges.

DUI charge was thrown out by Court when police officer failed to adhere to mandatory videotaping policy when the police officer "chose not to" record certain traffic stops. The prosecutor conceded that the videotaping policy was not optional and they could not produce a good reason for not videotaping the driver's stop.

Second Judicial Circuit (Leon County).

Use of a narcotics dog to sniff a vehicle does not constitute a search or seizure, and may be conducted during a consensual encounter or traffic stop.  This may occur when an officer is still writing a citation during a traffic stop .  However, when a driver is stopped for a traffic infraction and there is no suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may detain the occupants no longer than the time it takes to write a citation.

Firefighter stopped the driver of a vehicle that he believed to be under the influence by using his vehicle's emergency lights. The firefighter remained in his vehicle until police officers arrived but did nothing to prevent the driver from leaving the scene. The Court explained that the firefighter's actions fall under Citizen's Stop and Citizen's Arrest.Accordingto the Court, thelaw does not recognize or allow a mere citizen detention or seizure without an accompanying arrest. Thus, thestop was not part of a lawful citizen's arrest and all evidence seized by the police officer's was inadmissible. DUI charge was thrown out.

 Second Judicial Circuit (Leon County).