Police officer stopped a vehicle because of a supposed "equipment violation" as only one of two tag lights were working.  The Court held this was a mistake of law and did not establish probable cause to stop the vehicle.  Furthermore, the officer was not authorized to stop a vehicle under Florida Statute for unsafe or improper equipment, where state did not show that the malfunctioning of one of the vehicle's two tag lights rendered the vehicle not equipped as required by law or unsafe.  Thus, Court found stop of the vehicle was illegal and all evidence was suppressed.

Officers  were conducting a foot patrol of an apartment complex when their attention was drawn to a vehicle because it was parked in an area that did not have marked spaces. As the officers approached, the car began to drive away.  The officers stopped the vehicle because it was a high crime area, and they believed that a city ordinance required parking in a designated parking spot.  The Court acknowledged the cases which state that unprovoked flight from a high-crime area upon the approach of a police vehicle give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and, therefore, justified a Terry stop.  However, the Court said that that flight on foot is distinctly different than flight in a car. When “headlong flight” occurs on foot, the defendant's intent to elude an officer may be clear, even though no law is [known to be] broken. When “flight” occurs in a vehicle, the vehicle often conceals the emotions of its occupants and it is more difficult to determine that such a defendant is demonstrating “nervous, evasive behavior,” or is intending to engage in “headlong” flight.  Thus, the Court found the stop of the vehicle by the officers was an illegal detention

Officer's seizure of candy container and its contents following traffic stop was not justified by plain feel doctrine exception to search warrant requirement, and thus search of container to determine contents was invalid; officer clearly identified object as plastic candy container and not weapon by its contour and mass, and because officer used his tactile sense to identify plastic container, officer was unable to determine that container possessed incriminating character or was contraband merely by its contour, size, and shape.  The Court also said the officer's seach exceeded the scope of a search for "officer safety."  The search should have ended when he identified object as candy container, and although officer's experience with narcotics cases might have led him to believe that opaque candy container held crack cocaine, he was only permitted to pat down defendant for safety.

The warning given a driver who was arrested for dui erroneously informed her that her driving privileges would be suspended if she refused to submit to a breath, blood or urine test.The Court concluded that the error may have misled the driver into thinking that she would have to submit to a more invasive test, the withdrawal of blood, than was authorized by the statute. Thus, the Court concluded that the officer's warning did not comply with the statute, and the license could not be suspended under the statute.

Police officer did not have a well-founded articulable suspicion, before detaining defendant, that defendant was engaging in any criminal activity, as was necessary for a valid investigatory stop, where officer testified that he saw two boys running from a wooded area onto the street, that one of the boys was carrying something and placed it in his pants, covering it with his shirt, and that he stopped the boys to find out “what was going on.”

To demonstrate that an alert by a narcotics detection dog is sufficiently reliable to furnish probable cause to search, the State must introduce evidence of the dog's “track record” or performance history. Id. Although the officer who handled the dog testified that the dog was certified and had completed 400 hours of training, the State failed to elicit any testimony from him regarding the dog's track record. The officer admitted that drugs are not always found when the dog alerts, but he could not quantify the percentage of false alerts. Under Matheson, the officer's testimony was inadequate to establish the dog's reliability. Thus, the State did not meet its burden to demonstrate that the officers had probable cause to search Gibson's car.

Before law enforcement officers may forcibly enter a home in exercise of a search warrant, the knock and announce statute requires law enforcement to announce their authority and purpose, and they must have been refused admittance into the home; refusal can be express or implied, and lack of response is deemed a refusal.  Additionally, an occupant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to law enforcement's request to enter the home in exercise of search warrant before law enforcement may forcibly enter; time periods less than five seconds are rarely deemed adequate, whereas periods in excess of fifteen seconds are often adequate.

Although defendant's motor vehicle had expired license plates, police officer did not have the authority under Florida law to have the vehicle impounded and, thus, the nonconsensual warrantless inventory search of the vehicle prior to towing and impounding was unreasonable; statute prohibiting motor vehicles with expired license plates from operating on roads did not authorize the impounding of such vehicles, and there was no evidence in the record suggesting that defendant's vehicle was illegally parked or created any type of traffic hazard.

THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

Submission of certified copy of defendant's criminal history report, her fingerprints, a report from the fingerprint analyst matching defendant to two of her prior bookings, and a certified copy of her driving record were insufficient to meet requirement for felony driving under the influence (DUI) that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had at least three prior DUI convictions and was the person convicted on those prior occasions.

Officers who were conducting warrantless search pursuant to exigent circumstance exception were not authorized to seize containers in defendant's motel room even though containers themselves were in plain view; officers lacked probable cause to believe containers held contraband, and incriminating nature of contents was not immediately apparent.

THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

Provision of the State Uniform Traffic Control law, which authorizes vehicle stops for equipment that is "not in proper adjustment or repair," does not encompass windshield cracks; thus, a stop for a cracked windshield is permissible only where an officer reasonably believes that the crack renders the vehicle "in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property.

Defendant was not required by statute to signal before making lane change, and thus his failure to signal did not provide probable cause for a traffic stop, where, according to testimony of both the police officer and defendant, no other traffic on the road was affected by defendant's failure to signal.  The failure to maintain a single lane alone cannot establish probable cause for a traffic stop when the action is done safely.

THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED AND IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

Sheriffs's deputy, who entered defendant's property while pursuing defendant's husband for fleeing the scene of a motor vehicle accident, was unlawfully inside defendant's fenced yard and residence, and therefore was not lawfully executing a legal duty, as required by statutes pertaining to offenses of resisting an officer with violence and battery on a law enforcement officer, at time of his violent encounters with defendant; deputy did not have consent, a search warrant, or an arrest warrant, husband was not a fleeing felon, nor could deputy have believed that he was, husband was under no obligation to engage in conversation with deputy because deputy communicated no intention to detain him, and potential offenses committed by husband, including fleeing the scene of a motor vehicle accident and obstructing an officer in performance of a legal duty, were misdemeanors.