« Frost v. State (4th District Court of Appeals, January 26th, 2011) | Main | A.B.S. v. State (Second District Court of Appeals, December 29th, 2010). »
Monday
Jan242011

Hill v. State (1st District Court of Appeals January 24th, 2011)

An officer was traveling through Midway, Florida, an area which had recently been the site of several burglaries and reports of suspicious activities. However, no burglaries or suspicious activities were reported on the night in question. The officer testified that, while driving, he observed the Defendant standing in front of a parked car in the vacant parking lot of a closed Pure Gas Station at 1:15 a.m. The Defendant “looked right at me went to his driver's door, got in and took off....” The officer made a U-turn to investigate when the appellant entered his car and departed from the lot.  He followed the Defendant's car for “about a mile and a half” while running a tag check. He did not notice anything unusual about the vehicle or about the way in which the appellant was driving it. However, the officer testified that he decided to stop appellant because the Pure Gas Station had been closed over two hours before he observed the appellant's car parked in the lot, because the Pure Station was located in a high crime area, and because appellant entered his car and departed from the Pure Station upon making eye contact with him.  After stopping the car, a nearby canine unit arrived and obtained a positive alert. The subsequent search of the car disclosed marijuanaand a loaded firearm.   The trial court held that, given the totality of the matters testified to by Sergeant Bringmans, a reasonable suspicion existed to stop the appellant's vehicle.  The Defendant appealed and the Circuit Court held the stop was illegal. 

First, the State justified the stop by arguing that the actions of the Defendant amounted to "Headlong flight."  Headlong flight has been held to be the consummate act of evasion.  And, while not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, Headlong flight in a high crime area may provide an officer with a reasonable suspicion to investigate further. F.E.A. v. State,804 So.2d 528, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).  This is often called the Rule of Wardlow.

However, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is not established simply because a defendant leaves the scene when an officer nears. See F.E.A. Further, when a party leaves the scene in a car, a party's intent is not always clear. See Cunningham v. State,884 So.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). As explained in Paff v. State,884 So.2d 271, 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), a “car that obeys all traffic regulations when leaving a location when a police car arrives would seem to be the motor vehicle equivalent of a person who simply walks away from an officer on foot. Such a person does not invoke the rule of Wardlow.

Under these facts, the stop cannot be deemed lawful under Wardlow and its progeny. See Hewlett v. State,599 So.2d 757 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)(holding stop of vehicle was unlawful where three men, who were aside a vehicle parked next to property of a known drug dealer but who were personally unknown to police, jumped into the vehicle and drove away at a lawful rate of speed as an officer approached)

Notes: Interesting discussion of the Rule of Wardlow and it's application.